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Abstract—Software products are rarely developed from scratch
and vulnerabilities in such products might reside in parts that are
either open source software or provided by another organization.
Hence, the total cybersecurity of a product often depends on
cooperation, explicit or implicit, between several organizations.
We study the attitudes and practices of companies in software
ecosystems towards sharing vulnerability information. Further-
more, we compare these practices to contemporary cybersecurity
recommendations. This is performed through a questionnaire-
based qualitative survey. The questionnaire is divided into two
parts: the providers’ perspective and the acquirers’ perspective.
The results show that companies are willing to share informa-
tion with each other regarding vulnerabilities. Sharing is not
considered to be harmful neither to the cybersecurity nor their
business, even though a majority of the respondents consider
vulnerability information sensitive. However, the companies,
despite being open to sharing, are less inclined to proactively
sharing vulnerability information. Furthermore, the providers
do not perceive that there is a large interest in vulnerability
information from their customers. Hence, the companies’ overall
attitude to sharing vulnerability information is passive but open.
In contrast, contemporary cybersecurity guidelines recommend
active disclosure and sharing among actors in an ecosystem.
Index Terms—survey, cybersecurity, vulnerabilities
I. INTRODUCTION
Software products are rarely developed from scratch, nor by
a single company or organization. Third party components can
be both open source software (OSS) and purchased parts, and
might depend on continuously available services from others
to work as intended. The resulting product is the combined
efforts from a software ecosystem [1]. Any component of the
software can have vulnerabilities, whether developed internally
or acquired. Vulnerabilities are “...‘flaws’ or ‘mistakes’ in
computer-based systems that may be exploited to compromise
the network and information security of affected systems” [2].
The total cybersecurity cannot be handled by any one organi-
zation alone. Rather, it depends on the cooperation of several
organizations.
We define cybersecurity as measures taken to prevent, de-
tect, and react to actions that may compromise confidentiality,
integrity, or availability to data or devices, primarily in the
context of Internet connectivity.
There are new vulnerabilities disclosed every day. Between
2005 and 2016, the number of new vulnerabilities reported
in the National Vulnerability Database (NVD) [3] ranged
between 4 000-8 000 per year. In 2017 and 2018, around
14 700 and 16 500 new vulnerabilities respectively were
reported. It requires both effort and knowledge to be able
to evaluate these vulnerabilities, sometimes found in several
different public databases, non-trivial to fuse when there is
conflicting information [4].
The situation is further aggravated by the fact that infor-
mation on a vulnerability alone is often not enough to assess
whether there is an impact on the cybersecurity of a product.
The configuration of the product, how the vulnerability can
be exploited, the environment in which the product is running,
etc., impact the damage of a vulnerability. An acquired compo-
nent might use OSS with vulnerabilities. Hence, there is a need
to understand not just the components developed internally but
also those acquired. Even if a product might be susceptible to
an exploit, it might still be more economical from a business
perspective not to fix the product. For example, if the fixing
and updating is expensive and the risk of the product being
exploited is low. At the same time, the customers’ best interest
must also be considered, and it might be morally questionable
to leave vulnerabilities in the software without informing them.
Previous research suggests appropriate timing is an important
aspect both for vulnerability disclosure by vendors [5] and
patching by their customers [6].
In this paper, we surveyed companies’ attitudes towards
sharing information on their vulnerabilities within the value
chain. Specifically, we studied the two perspectives of organi-
zations providing and organizations acquiring software.
RQ1 What is the attitude towards sharing vulnerability infor-
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mation within the software ecosystem?
RQ2 How do contemporary cybersecurity recommendations
align with companies’ preferences for vulnerability dis-
closure for (IoT) ecosystems?
A company can either have an acquirer role or a provider
role in a software ecosystem, or it has both roles. An acquirer
receives software or uses a service from another company
or organization, e.g. for a smart home, an acquirer acquires
intelligent light switches with hardware, software, and radio.
The acquirer in turn provides a product or service to others. A
provider might also acquire parts of the software they provide.
For example, the provider of intelligent light switches might
develop the hardware and software for the light switches, but
not the radio component.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Background
and related work is found in Section II. Section III outlines
the research method. The results from the survey are found
in Section IV and the discussion is found in Section V. The
paper is concluded with Section VI.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
A. Background
The contemporary recommendations are to share informa-
tion within the software ecosystem to ensure the cybersecurity
of the system as a whole. However, as pointed out above, the
optimal timing of disclosures is non-trivial [5], [7], [8].
The U.S. Department of Homeland Security released a
document in 2016 with non-binding principles and best prac-
tices for security in connected devices [9]. They recom-
mends that vulnerability disclosure should involve developers,
manufacturers, and service providers. It should also include
information regarding any vulnerabilities reported to a com-
puter security incident response team (CSIRT). The U.S.
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has released similar
recommendations [10], [11]. The European Union Agency for
Network and Information Security (ENISA) released a report
in November 2017 [12], recognizing the need for coordinated
vulnerability disclosure and the importance of participating
in information sharing platforms. These recommendations are
also acknowledged by national bodies, e.g., the Swedish Civil
Contingencies Agency (MSB) in Sweden [13].
The Broadband Internet Technical Advisory Group (BITAG)
has released recommendations stating that manufacturers
should report information on software vulnerabilities that
pose security or privacy threats to consumers [14]. The IoT
Security Foundation (IoTSF) state in their guidelines that an
organization should have a mechanism for issuing security
advisories for informing users when a problem is fixed [15],
[16]. The Online Trust Alliance (OTA) – an initiative within
the Internet Society (ISOC) – has released an IoT Security &
Privacy Trust Framework [17]. They recommended responsible
remediate of vulnerabilities and threats.
B. Related work
Mufti et al. performed a systematic mapping study and a
set of case studies where they develop and evaluate a “readi-
ness model” for security requirements engineering [18]. The
mapping study included a literature study with 104 primary
studies on security requirements engineering. The resulting
model describes readiness in maturity levels from ‘initial’
with no security requirements to ‘monitored’ with security
requirements for prevention and long-term goals.
In our previous work, we present an interview-based qualita-
tive survey [19]. The purpose of that survey was to understand
how security vulnerabilities, especially in third party software
in IoT systems, are managed by industrial organizations. We
saw that companies can be characterized according to their
role in the system development value chain, from component
developer to system integrator, i.e., a classification which can
be used to describe sharing of information, and is similar to
that in this paper. Another interview study on security and IoT
is presented by Asplund et al. [20]. They investigate the degree
to which security is seen as important by practitioners. They
found that legacy systems enhanced by IoT solutions were
often highly critical for society, which could slow down the
process of transforming them into an IoT architecture, and they
also found that system availability in general is more important
than confidentiality of data. That is, they saw that engineers
in different domains value (aspects of) security differently.
III. RESEARCH METHOD
The purpose of this qualitative survey [21] was to explore
how companies reason about sharing information on vulnera-
bilities either in their own software or other companies’ with
whom they have a business relationship – bilateral or other.
The survey was partly descriptive and partly exploratory [22].
It was descriptive in that the ecosystems and the companies
are described. It was exploratory in that we want to build up
an understanding of scenarios of how companies reason about
information on vulnerabilities in general and sharing of vul-
nerability related information within their software ecosystem
in particular.
A. Study design
In the previous work, we identified that there is a need to
further understand vulnerability management within software
ecosystems [19]. In the current study, we focused on the B2B
relationships among companies with either a provider or an
acquirer role in the software ecosystem.
1) Questionnaire design: We developed the first version
of the questionnaire based on related work. We iterated the
development of the questionnaire twice, with internal reviews
among the authors in each iteration. We also asked a colleague
external to the project to review the questionnaire after the sec-
ond iteration. The final version of the questionnaire consisted
of four parts:1
1) Five context questions to characterize the companies.
2) Five groups of Likert items2 on vulnerability manage-
ment and related practices for providers.
1The two versions of the questionnaire, including all Likert items [21] used
can be found at https://sics.box.com/s/daok9em2txe1625o2ubzl99gj5nrwora
2A Likert item is one statement that the respondent should judge whether
they agree or disagree to it.
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TABLE I
THE GROUPS OF LIKERT ITEMS AND THEIR CORRESPONDING IDENTIFIERS
IN THE PROVIDER AND ACQUIRER PART1 – SEE ALSO FIGURE 1 AND
FIGURE 2.
Identifying number
Likert item groups Provider Acquirer
Practices and prevalence of OSS 6 12
Description of the business ecosystem 7 13
Information sharing in the value chain 8 14
Effects of information sharing
in the value chain 9 15
Practices related to software
update and release management. 10 16
3) Five groups of Likert item on vulnerability management
and related practices for acquirers.
4) Four general fix-answers questions on the companies’
handling of cybersecurity.
The attitude towards being more open to share information
regarding vulnerabilities was investigated. Hence, a high sum
total score on the Likert items should indicate a willingness
to share information with others and a low score that the
companies are less inclined to do so. The two parts for
providers and acquirers are mirrored as far as possible. If there
is a Likert item for the provider part, it is usually also found in
the acquirer part. This means we can compare the perspectives.
Companies can be both providers and acquirers at the same
time, though this is not always the case. The five groups of
Likert items make up the Likert scales found in Table I.
We decided to have five fixed-alternative expressions, rang-
ing from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree” [21]. We also
decided to include a ”do not know/not applicable” alternative
as it is plausible that not all respondents can answer all items
in the Likert questions [23]. Lastly, three items in each of the
two parts were deliberately phrased negatively in the sense
that a disagreement should be treated as an agreement and
vice verse.
2) Execution: In the first data collection round, we asked
members of a cybersecurity project to fill in the survey.
In this step, we selected the companies purposely [21] as
we knew their interest and maturity in cybersecurity. The
respondents were security experts from the large and medium
sized companies and managers from the small companies.
Based on the first round, we made some adjustments to
the questionnaire. Specifically, we added one Likert item to
two groups for the provider part (6f and 9c) and to the two
corresponding groups for the acquirer part (12f and 15c). In
addition, we removed one Likert item from one question for
the provider part1 (13d in the first version of the questionnaire).
As the changes are minor, we see no risk in using those
answers along with the rest of the answers.
For the second round, we first used a systematic sample
with large companies in Sweden3 as our sample frame [23].
3We selected the companies registered at the Swedish stock exchange on
the large capital list. At the time of the study, it was 94 companies. However,
we excluded pure investment companies. Therefore our sample frame was 84
companies.
We approached the companies through their web page and
contact information which could be found there. We asked to
get in touch with CTOs, business managers, etc., within the
companies. We employed a person on an hourly basis to elicit
the answers from the companies. They contacted companies
both via e-mail and by phone. Once a contact was established
– beyond the generic switchboard – we reminded them every
second week and we sent them up to 5 reminders. We got
answers from managers either specifically for security or for
IT.
In the third round, we used the same questionnaire as in
the second round. To complement the answers gathered in the
first and second round, we utilized our professional networks
to elicit additional answers, i.e., convenience sampling [23].
The respondents were more mixed but overall individuals with
good insight into the software development of their companies
but not necessarily cybersecurity.
IV. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
A. Sample companies
In total, we got answers from 17 companies of different
sizes and various domains, see Table II. 5 companies answered
only the provider part, 4 companies answered only the acquirer
part and 8 companies answered both parts.
TABLE II
LIST OF COMPANIES AND THEIR SIZE, IN TERMS OF NUMBER OF
EMPLOYEES.
Round Large
> 250
Medium
< 250
Small
< 50
Micro
< 10
Total
First 14 1 2 44
Second 3 3
Third 7 3 10
Total 104 1 2 3 174
In the first round, there were 4 companies . We got answers
for all of them, as expected since we knew they had an interest
in the subject.
In the second round, 84 companies from our sample frame
contacted. 18 companies could not find an appropriate person
who was willing to answer the questionnaire. 52 companies
never replied at all. Our initial email bounced for 9 companies
and we could not find other ways to contact them. Three
companies explicitly said they would not answer the survey
as they neither provide nor acquire software-intense products
relevant for our study. We got answers from 3 companies.
In the third round, we used convenience sampling. In total,
we contacted 22 companies. This resulted in 10 answers.
The large company from round one also provided an answer
in round two. However, the answer was provided by different
individuals, though from the same business unit. The answers
are very similar. Therefore, we decided to keep the answer
4The large company in round one also provided an answer in round two.
When the answer is removed, we have answers from 9 large companies and
in total 16 companies, cf. Section IV-A, second to last paragraph.
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from round two, as round two is from a methodology per-
spective more rigorous.
All of the companies are active in Sweden, operating on
an international market. All of the large companies have
development units both within and outside Sweden whereas
the non-large companies have their development work in
Sweden.
B. Final Likert scale
In order to select the items of the Likert scale to use in
the analysis, we perform an item analysis to identify which
of the items that have discriminative power [21]. (As three
items in each part of the survey are phrased negatively, we first
inverted those answers before performing the item analysis.)
Those items with the largest discriminative power are those
that best answer the overall question of the attitude of sharing
vulnerability information. The following items are removed:
• The items related to the business ecosystem both for the
provider (group 7) and the acquirer part (group 13) have
a low discriminative power.
• One item from the OSS group in the provider part has
no counterpart in the acquirer part and low discriminative
power (item 6e).
• For release management and software updates, one item
(10b) in the provider part has no corresponding item in
the acquirer part and a low discriminative power.
• Two items (10c and 10e and the corresponding 16c and
16d) have a low discriminative power in both parts.
One item in the acquirer part (12e) has no corresponding
item in the provider part but a high discriminative power. That
item is retained in the final scale. The final Likert scale is
found in Figure 1.
C. Analysis
1) Practices and prevalence of OSS: OSS is a significant
part of the products for many companies in the study (cf.
6a and 12a in Figure 1). However, it is a larger part in the
non-large (medium, small, and micro) companies than in large
companies, see Figure 2. Hence, smaller companies seem to
utilize OSS more than larger companies in the survey. How-
ever, the companies are less inclined to actively contribute to
OSS projects (6b, 6c, 12b and 12c). Non-large companies seem
slightly more inclined to contribute than large companies. The
difference is smaller than the difference on prevalence on OSS.
Another similarity between providers and acquirers is that
non-large companies seldom have dedicated individuals who
monitor forums on cybersecurity for OSS, e.g., NVD and
exploit-DB (6d and 12d in Figure 1). It seems like larger
companies in the survey are more inclined to have dedicated
individuals monitoring vulnerabilities databases, independent
of role (6d and 12d in Figure 2).
Acquirers use more third-party software or service to
keep track of vulnerabilities in OSS used (6f and 12f) than
providers. Also, the acquirers seem to demand that providers
keep their OSS component updated with the latest version –
more than the providers are inclined to provide it (6g and 12g).
There is no difference between large companies and non-large
companies in the survey.
2) Information sharing in the value chain: The providers
answer more positive to sharing vulnerability information with
their customer (8a). The acquirers indicate that they do not get
security information from their providers (14a) – with a similar
pattern for critical vulnerabilities (8c and 14c in Figure 1).
Non-large acquirers answered, in the median, around “Neither
agree nor disagree”, see Figure 2.
Both acquirers and providers are inclined to ask for infor-
mation on vulnerabilities. The acquirers seem less inclined
to ask the providers for information on security whereas the
providers comply with requests from acquirers on security
(8b and 14b in Figure 1) – no difference whether a large
or non-large company. This is in line with that the providers
perceive an interest in cybersecurity from their customers (8e
and 14e in Figure 1) – which acquirers also answer. Both
providers and acquirers are aligned in the perception that
cybersecurity information is sensitive and that vulnerabilities
addressed should be communicated in, e.g., release notes (8f,
8g, 14f and 14g in Figure 1) – no difference between large
and non-large companies.
3) Effects of information sharing in the value chain: The
items related to the information sharing practices – groups 8
and 14 – are contrasted by the items related to the effect of
information sharing in the value chain – groups 9 and 15. For
the latter, the attitude in general is more positive to sharing
than compared to the actual practices from the former. Most
answers are either neutral or positive, cf. Figure 1 (note that
9a and 15a are negatively posed and should be interpreted
inversely). The exception is the item asking whether sharing
cybersecurity information is harmful (9a), where the attitude
from the providers is more balanced. Furthermore, non-large
providers are less inclined to consider vulnerability informa-
tion to be harmful than larger companies, see 9a in Figure 2.
The profile is similar between providers and acquirers, albeit
the latter is less extreme in their answers.
4) Practices related to software update and release man-
agement: Both acquirers and providers indicate in their an-
swers that updating software is costly (10d and 16c). However,
the acquirers still have an ambition to keep the software up to
date (16a). Providers, when asked if they update their software
frequently (daily or weekly) indicated that they do not (10a).
However, as that item is expressed using the extreme value of
daily or weekly, the results should be interpreted with care.
Lastly in the group on release management, the acquirers
are more positive to pay for updates than the providers
perceive (10f and 16e). The answers from large and non-large
companies are, in the median, similar.
5) General questions on cybersecurity: 41% (7) answered
that they are using a third-party service to handle cyberse-
curity and 23% (4) answered that they have not considered
it (question 17). In terms of cybersecurity competence, 9
answered that they have competence within the company to
handle cybersecurity and 8 that they do not (question 18).
Cyber insurance is only used by 2 of the companies in the
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Fig. 1. Providers and acquirers, stacked bar charts representing the frequency of answers per Likert item (i.e. each item sums up to 100%). Note that the
answers are inverted for 6 items as the questions are phrased negatively, see Section IV-B. Also note that item 12e does not have a corresponding item in the
provider part.
study and 10 of the companies have not even considered it
(question 19). This is not surprising, as it is known that cyber
insurance uptake in Sweden is still low [24]. Lastly, 9 of the
companies find cybersecurity to be very important whereas
8 do not prioritize it (question 20). There is no correlation
among these questions (17-20).
V. DISCUSSION
Half of the companies in the survey answered that they only
have a basic understanding of cybersecurity, which seems to
be uncorrelated to how important cybersecurity is perceived.
The sample is likely skewed, however, as it is plausible that
people are more inclined to participate in the survey if they
have an interest in cybersecurity. This is further reinforced
by our difficulties to elicit answers, especially in round two.
Despite a substantial investment with an hourly employed
person to elicit answers, we only got a 3.6% response rate
in this round, even though several of the companies indicate
that they find cybersecurity important. We see three possible
explanations for the difficulties to elicit answers, in addition
to survey-fatigue and scarcity of time that affects all surveys:
1) even though the spontaneous answer is that cybersecurity is
important, in reality respondents are not prepared to actually
invest in it, 2) the topic of the survey is advanced and many
organizations simply lack the experience and competence to
answer the questionnaire, and 3) the topic is considered too
sensitive to answer. The first two explanations might indicate
a need to raise the cybersecurity awareness and competence
in industry.
The prevalence and approach to OSS is similar between
providers and acquirers. However, as the acquirers are not
updating the software with the latest OSS version themselves,
they expect the providers to take the cost. Also, as the acquirers
are likely less capable of handling vulnerabilities on the OSS
components, they are more inclined to use third-party tools or
services to monitor the security. Hence, the awareness of the
importance of having a proactive attitude to updated software
seems to falter.
A. RQ1 What is the attitude towards sharing vulnerability
information within the software ecosystem?
In general, companies seem reactive rather than proactive
when it comes to information sharing of vulnerabilities. There
is a willingness to share information, at least with business
partners (8a, 8b, 14a, and 14b), however, it does not seem to
be proactive and planned upfront (8c, 8d, 14d). At the same
time, the attitude to sharing is positive as seen in groups 9
and 15. This indicates that the perception of wanted position
and the actual reality in the companies is not aligned. This
is similar to the handling of OSS. The companies commonly
use OSS (items 6a and 12a), however, are less inclined to
contribute back or actively participating in the community
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Fig. 2. Large and non-large companies, stacked bar charts representing the frequency of answers per Likert item (i.e. each item sums up to 100%). (Non-large
are the medium, small and micro companies.) Note that the answers are inverted for 6 items as the questions are phrased negatively, see Section IV-B.
(items 6b, 6c, 12b and 12c). This indicates that the companies
do not have an elaborate OSS or software ecosystem strategy,
whether large or non-large. Rather, it seems as if they want
to get access to assets but do not see the benefit from giving
away assets without monetary compensation. This indicates
that the companies in the survey have not yet s en the benefit
of sharing, indicating an immaturity. Interestingly, this is true
even for non-large companies, which we expected to be more
active and involved in OSS communities.
Both providers and acquirers consider vulnerability informa-
tion to be sensitive (items 8f and 14f). When asked whether
they do not share cybersecurity information because sharing
it can be harmful (items 9a and 15a), the attitude seems
contradictory to the previous question. We interpret this as
an indication that respondents are unsure how sensitive it is
to share vulnerability information. There might also be an
influence from the wording – and therefore the interpretation
– of the questions on the answers. Interestingly, the attitude
to being transparent and open with vulnerabilities is overall
positive (9b and 15b). This can be contrasted to the perception
that the counterparts in the software ecosystem are negative to
disclosing vulnerability information (9f and 15f respectively).
We speculate that this is due to self-serving bias, where oneself
is considered overly mature and counterparts overly immature.
Overall, in relation to the research question, we hypothesize
that there is a lack of maturity and therefore practices for how
to handle vulnerability disclosure.
In relation to RQ1, we interpret the answers that overall
the companies do not have explicit nor elaborate practices
regarding sharing of vulnerability information. Furthermore,
the companies seem, in general, to consider vulnerability
information to be sensitive, though this is not a well-informed
opinion.
B. RQ2 How do contemporary cybersecurity recommenda-
tions align with companies’ preference for vulnerability dis-
closure for (IoT) ecosystems?
As outlined in the background section (Section II-A),
government agencies and industry interest groups in general
promote disclosure and sharing of vulnerability information
in the software ecosystem. Both American and European gov-
ernment agencies recommend (proactive) and even coordinated
disclosure [9], [12]. The idea is that if the actors in a software
ecosystem cooperate, cybersecurity will be improved. The
BITAG and ISOC organizations go even further and indicate
that threats should be reported to the consumers as well [14],
[17]. In our survey, providers tend to be less proactive in
Pr
e-p
rin
t
providing information but do provide it if requested. On the
other hand, acquirers are not that interested in cybersecurity.
Also, vulnerability information is considered sensitive – at
least by providers. Hence, there seems to be a tendency to
keep information confidential as a way to achieve “security
through obscurity”. Therefore, even the respondents who rate
themselves as competent in the area of cybersecurity seem
to be misaligned with contemporary recommendations. We
speculate that this is a combination of lack of competence
in cybersecurity as well as a lack of understanding how
to communicate around vulnerabilities as it can be seen as
negative from the market [25] and customer perspectives.
Indeed, vulnerability disclosure could be a tragedy of the
commons, where the recommendations are correct that overall
cybersecurity would increase if there was more information
sharing, but individual companies still could be worse off im-
plementing such practices, at least in the short run. However,
it could also be that information sharing is good for individual
companies even in the short run, but that they fail to appreciate
this, e.g., because the investments needed to become more
mature are more tangible than the benefits entailed. These
lines of reasoning imply that it is not just about increasing the
cybersecurity knowledge in the software development parts of
a company but a more general problem that requires a broader
approach outside the technical roles.
There are also recommendations, e.g., from ISOC [17],
on the software update release process. Acquirers seem quite
willing to update often and even pay for updates. The providers
seem less inclined to providing updates with the same fre-
quency. Most of the cost might be on the provider, explaining
this. It can also be, however, that providers have a deeper and
more nuanced insight into the actual need for updates from a
technical perspective, whereas acquirers simply always want
“latest and greatest”. This discrepancy indicates that there is
a mismatch in the software ecosystem in understanding each
other in terms of incentives and willingness to pay for updated
software. For cybersecurity, this might imply that the lack of
communication and mutual understanding of the actual need
for addressing vulnerabilities lead to unnecessary cost and
efforts. At the same time, the acquirers are somewhat inclined
to trust their providers (12e in Figure 1). This implies that
there is a lack of practices and an underlying assumption that
the counterparts in the software ecosystem can be trusted.
C. Threats to validity and reliability
Here the validity of the conducted research is discussed
based on commonly considered validity threats, e.g., as listed
in [26].
Content validity concerns how appropriate the contents of
the survey questions are to the respondents. The questions
asked concern cybersecurity, which requires some level of
competence to answer. Because of that, measures were taken
not only to formulate the questions in a clear and understand-
able way with terms used in industry, but also to find the
right persons in the organizations to answer the questions.
In the first round, questions were answered by respondents
participating in a research project on cybersecurity, which
means that uncertainties in the questions could be solved. In
the later rounds initial contacts were often taken with subjects
in management positions, but they were asked to get support
by experts in their organizations. During the research it was
found that this type of questions can be difficult to answer,
at least when seeking an answer for the entire company.
This emphasizes the importance of formulating the questions
as clearly as possible, and spending effort on finding the
right respondents. We believe the measures we have taken
appropriately address the threats to content validity.
Construct validity concern the degree to which the con-
structs investigated are actually measured by the questions.
In this type of study this is a threat since there is a risk
that people do not interpret the questions in the way in-
tended by the researchers, especially when they cover aspects
such as cybersecurity that requires some specific competence
to understand. Well formulated questions increase both the
number of possible respondents and the likelihood that they
understand the content of the questions. The questions were
developed in iterations, which we believe resulted in questions
with lowered risk of misinterpretations. Also, in the first round
they were answered by respondents in a research project on
cybersecurity, which we believe made these respondents more
motivated to understand the questions and to give feedback
than would be the case if we had started with respondents
from the later rounds.
Reliability concerns the degree to which a respondent would
hypothetically give the same answers if they answered the
same questions again under the same conditions, or if two
persons would give the same answers, e.g., measured by
a measure of rater agreement. We have not measured the
agreement between respondents since the sample represents
different views. If the sample would be significantly larger it
may have been possible to study groups of respondents, but
with this sample size it is not realistic.
The validity of a survey is, of course, affected by the possi-
bility to generalize from the sample to the entire sample frame.
We cannot argue to have a statistically rigorous sampling
approach (cf. Section III). However, our main aim is not to
quantitatively survey and make generalization statements of a
population. Rather, our aim is to understand the diversity and
different approaches, i.e. the same reason we do not investigate
rater agreement when we analyze reliability. Hence, we are not
attempting to generalize the findings to an entire population.
However, at the same time, the threats to generalization should
not be exaggerated [27]. As we have covered different com-
pany sizes, several domains, both technical and non-technical
ones, and many locations in Sweden, we believe the findings to
be, at least to some extent, relevant for providers and acquirers
of software-intense products. We should have some coverage
of relevant phenomena in that domain even though we cannot
make statements of the statistical significance.
For the larger companies there may be several more or less
independent parts of the companies. Hence, for those cases,
the answers are more from that part of the company rather
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than for the entire company. Again, this of course is a threat
to generalization. At the same time, even though results are not
statistically significant, we do believe the findings in general
are relevant for the entire population.
VI. CONCLUSION
The attitude towards open communities and sharing of infor-
mation is, in general, positive. However, when asked specific
questions, respondents’ attitude seems to be that it is OK to use
information and source code from others but the companies
are less positive to actually contributing themselves, whether
to OSS development or to vulnerability information disclosure.
In combination with what seems to be a lack of established
practices and procedures on vulnerability disclosure and com-
munication, we identify a need to further improve the com-
petences required for this. Furthermore, we call for improved
processes and decision support within product management
and market communication, etc., as vulnerability handling is
not isolated to purely technical issues. Lastly, there might be
a further need to adapt and establish recommendations from
government agencies and industry interest groups.
The practical implication of this study is that there is a need
for companies to increase their knowledge of vulnerability
management in general and specifically understanding their
own technical environment to be able to make informed deci-
sions on how to analyze and share vulnerability information.
There also seems to be a role for a trusted third party to
facilitate the sharing of vulnerability information. However, we
believe there is a need to better understand the vulnerability
sharing in order to provide validated guidelines. Future re-
search should address business models related to vulnerability
information sharing. Furthermore, we believe there is a need to
better understand how individual vulnerabilities in individual
parts of a larger software system configuration impacts the
overall cybersecurity. Lastly, there is a need to better under-
stand how to upfront design complex systems made up of
components from several companies and OSS communities to
allow for analyzability of the resulting cybersecurity.
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